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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
Supreme Court under Article VIII, § 3, of the Utah Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) ; and Rule 45, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this being a review of the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals by a grant of Plaintiff's Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the 
Summary Judgment entered by the District Court in favor of the 
State of Utah on the issue of "governmental immunity'1? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the 
Summary Judgment entered in favor of the Union Pacific Railroad 
in assessing its duties to improve warning devices at railway 
crossings? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are believed to be 
determinative of the issues presented above: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-15, et seq. (1990); 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (1990); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1990); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990); 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The contents of the cited authority are fully set forth in the 
Addendum to this Brief in accord with Rule 24(f), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceeding and 
Disposition in the Lower Court. 
These proceedings originated as a wrongful death action 
filed by the heirs and/or estates of four individuals who were 
killed in an automobile/train collision which occurred in rural 
Tooele County, Utah. Named as Defendants were Tooele County 
(subsequently dismissed by stipulation), the State of Utah, Union 
Pacific Railroad and its train operator, Paul Kleinman. (R. 9, 
82 and 86). 
The Complaint stated four Causes of Action; negligent 
operation of the train on the part of Union Pacific and its 
employee Kleinman; negligent maintenance and a failure to install 
proper warning devices at the railway crossing by the State 
(through the Utah Department of Transportation, !lUDOT") and 
railroad, and; Union Pacific's negligent entrustment of the train 
to an unfit operator, Defendant Kleinman. (R. 1-9). For 
purposes of the present review, the focus is on allegations of 
Defendants' failure to maintain adequate safeguards at the 
crossing. 
In addition to denying specific allegations of the 
Complaint, the State and Union Pacific affirmatively alleged 
contributory negligence on the part of Patrick Duncan, the 
automobile's driver. The State also defended on the grounds of 
sovereign immunity. Lastly, the Defendants pleaded a 
Counterclaim against the Estate of Patrick Duncan for indemnity 
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and contribution as to any recovery awarded other Plaintiffs. 
(R. 23-27 and 36-45). 
Following a period of discovery, Defendants filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment in the Fall of 1987. (R. 121-122 
and 127-128). Among supporting Affidavits submitted by 
Defendants were those of Paul Kleinman, as to operation of the 
train; numerous members of UDOT surveillance teams, as to the 
decision on whether or not to upgrade warning devices at the 
crossing by installation of automatic gates, and; Affidavits by 
persons who had examined the crossing and testified to its 
general condition and that of the surrounding terrain. In 
response, Plaintiffs offered the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin as 
an expert witness who had visited and examined the subject 
crossing and opined as to whether it was "extra-hazardous11. (R. 
192) . 
Important to the issues presently pending before the 
Court, the Affidavits submitted by UDOT!s surveillance team 
members described the process by which crossings received 
priority for funding to upgrade warning devices. This process 
can best be described as incorporating information and 
projections as to automobile and train traffic, speed, crossing 
angle and predicted and actual accident rates into a mathematical 
formula (the "Hazard Rating Index") which, if a certain level was 
reached, would result in funding. The Affidavits indicated a 
recommendation to install automatic crossing gates at Droubay 
Road prior to the Duncan accident but installation was postponed 
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until Federal funding became available. (R. 357-359 and 403-
405) . 
After oral argument on the Motions, and in the face of 
UDOTfs recommendation to upgrade warning devices and the 
Crommelin Affidavit on the question of the crossing being "extra-
hazardous", District Judge Timothy R. Hanson entered Summary 
Judgment in favor of Defendants on November 17, 1987. (R. 477-
488 and appended hereto). The Memorandum Decision found that 
Plaintiffs had produced no evidence on negligent operation of the 
train and that, as a matter of law, the railroad had no duty as 
to placement of warning devices at the crossing. (R. 484). The 
Court went on to grant the State sovereign immunity, the 
determination as to enhancement of warning devices being the 
exercise of a "discretionary function". (R. 482). 
Judge Hanson's ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in its Opinion dated April 12, 1990.1 As described 
below, Judge Bullock assumed Plaintiffs had stated a prima facie 
case of negligence, but proceeded to find that Union Pacific had 
no duty to erect warning devices at the crossing (790 P.2d 599) 
and UDOT was shielded from liability by governmental immunity 
(790 P.2d 602). Plaintiffs assert that these decisions as to the 
relative duties of Defendants with respect to warning devices at 
the crossing and the availability of sovereign immunity for the 
State are contrary to prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 790 P.2d 595 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
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and Court of Appeals warranting a reversal and remand for 
purposes of trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Accident 
At approximately 8:50 p.m. on the night of April 9, 
1983, a northbound automobile driven by Patrick Duncan and 
containing passengers Jeffrey Bowers, his nine month old 
daughter, Nicole Bowers and Ramon Henwood was struck by a 
westbound Union Pacific freight train in Tooele County, Utah. 
All four occupants of Duncan's 1978 Chevrolet Caprice died in the 
collision at the intersection of Droubay Road with Union 
Pacific's main line trackage. The 67 car train, operated by 
engineer Paul Kleinman sustained relatively minor damage to its 
lead locomotive. (R. 215 and 215). Weather was cloudy with a 
light rain falling. (R. 431) . 
Duncan, a California resident was unfamiliar with the 
crossing. He had been visiting relatives in Tooele and, on this 
particular occasion, was headed to the home of Steven Bowers 
(deceased Jeffrey Bowers' uncle) for a family gathering and 
dinner. (R. 215 and 427-428). 
Plaintiffs are the decedents heirs. To the extent not 
set forth above, deceased Patrick Duncan left, as his heirs, 
Louis and Noreen Duncan, father and mother respectively; Jason 
Duncan, son; and Michael, Tim, Kevin and Brian Duncan, brothers. 
Jeffrey Bowers and his daughter, Nicole Bowers, left as their 
heirs at law, Michelle Bowers, wife and mother, respectively; 
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Judson Bowers, father and grandfather; Florence Hanson, mother 
and grandmother; and Shelly and Sherrie Bowers, sister and aunt. 
Deceased Ramon Henwood left as his next of kin, Monica Henwood, 
wife; and Phillis and Owen Henwood, mother and father. (R. at 
8) . 
THE DROUBAY ROAD CROSSING 
Droubay Road is an essentially straight, two-lane road 
running north and south through rural Tooele County, Utah 
positioned approximately one-half the distance between State 
Highway 36 and the western foothills of the Oquirrh Mountains. 
The road is an important arterial in the County, serving the 
communities of Erda and Bates Canyon. At this crossing, Union 
Pacific!s rails traverse Droubay at an angle of slightly over 43° 
north and over 136° south of the track. (R. at 412). 
At the time of the accident, the only warning signs 
present from the northbound lane were a railroad advance warning 
sign (a circular yellow sign with a large black "X" and a "R" on 
either side of the intersecting lanes) located 300 feet from the 
crossing and two railroad crossing signs (white cross-bars with 
"railroad crossing11 printed in black letters) , 19 feet from the 
intersection.2 (R. at 410). 
The possible need to upgrade warning devices at the 
crossing was raised as early as September of 1979 when Union 
Federal standards mandate that in a rural area a railroad 
advance warning sign be located 750 feet in advance of a 
crossing. (R. at 188). 
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Pacific was approached by Tooele County in connection with a 
project to widen Droubay Road. W.A. Ridge, Union Pacific's 
superintendent stated "if the widening of the roadway will 
increase the vehicular traffic using the roadway, it would be 
well to indicate to the State if any additional crossing 
protection is required other than the standard cross-buck at the 
present location. ,f 
In November of 1981, UDOT re-evaluated the crossing at 
Droubay Road pursuant to a second request of the Tooele County 
Engineer. The surveillance team recommended a removal of 
automatic crossing signals from Bauer Road, another north-south 
arterial in the County which had recently been closed for 
installation at the Droubay Road crossing. (R. at 360 and 361). 
The closure had resulted in a projected increase of up to 1,500 
(from 100) vehicles on a daily basis, including a minimum of 4 
school buses. High speed automobile and train travel over the 
tracks was also noted by the surveillance team. (R. at 302). 
Despite the substantial diversion of high speed traffic to 
Droubay Road and over this particular crossing, installation of 
mechanical crossing gates was postponed until federal funding 
became available. (R. 403-405 and 357-359). This was because 
the "Hazard Index Rating" arrived at by the surveillance team 
allegedly fell just under that required to receive priority for 
upgrade funding. 
In May and June of 1983, immediately after notification 
of the fatal Duncan accident, the UDOT team conducted additional 
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inspections at the urging of Tooele County officials. (R. 303). 
At this time, flashing light signals with gates were proposed. 
The recommendation was warranted by "high traffic speed, 
including passenger train; high vehicular speed; moderately high 
train volume; high predicted accident rate." (emphasis added). 
(R. 298) . The high incidence of accidents at the Droubay Road 
crossing which supported the recommendation to install additional 
safeguards is evidenced by accident reports made part of the 
record at 212-221. These reports indicate that, as of May 18, 
1983, there had been three similar (for a total of four) 
accidents at the intersection. (R. 188). 
Another key factor in compiling the "hazard index" 
which ultimately prompted an upgrade was the "angle of crossing 
factor" at Droubay Road, 43°. This angle made it difficult to 
gauge the speed and distance of oncoming trains. (R. 189). 
Crommelin's Affidavit testimony on this point is substantiated by 
a test to estimate train speeds conducted by Highway Patrol 
Trooper Terry Smith and made part of the record at R. 433. Smith 
found: 
. . . at that angle to the train, it was very 
difficult to judge the speed of the train. I 
estimated the speed of the train at 45 m.p.h. 
and felt sure I had time to cross the 
intersection. On radar stationary, the train 
was traveling at 70 m.p.h. I would not have 
made it through the intersection if I had 
tried. The problem of estimating train speed 
is exacerbated at night, when the Duncan 
accident occurred." 
(R. 433). 
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Through use of the mechanical formula developed by the 
United States Department of Transportation, UDOT indexed the 
subject crossing at .21, well over the .15 index where additional 
precautions, such as automatic crossing gates are warranted. As 
a result, mechanical gates with flashers were installed at the 
Droubay Road intersection in 1985. Responsibility for 
construction work was shared by Union Pacific and Tooele County. 
(R. 303 and 298-299). In addition, Tooele County widened Droubay 
Road running north from the crossing by 10 feet to match the 
width on the southern approach. These remedial measures were too 
late to save the lives of Patrick Duncan, Jeffrey Bowers, Nicole 
Bowers, his daughter, and Ramon Henwood. 
It is submitted that the above facts, most of which are 
garnered from a canvas of Defendants' own Affidavits and evidence 
support a finding that the Droubay Road crossing was "extra-
hazardous." Nonetheless, and despite assuming Plaintiffs had 
stated a prima facie case of negligence, the Court of Appeals 
found no liability on the part of either the State or Union 
Pacific for dangerous conditions at the crossing. From this 
anomalous result springs the present review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
AT POINT I 
As a matter of law, the District Court and Court of 
Appeals relieved the railroad from any responsibility as to 
dangerous conditions created by inadequate warnings at railroad 
crossings. This was premised upon Utah statutes which vest 
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authority over highway signage with the Utah Department of 
Transportation. 
These rulings were erroneous. There is absolutely no 
indication that the legislature by enacting the statutory scheme 
(codified at Utah Code Ann. 54-4-15 et seq.) intended to abrogate 
the common law duties imposed upon railroads to make and maintain 
safe crossings. Nor is there any evidence that the legislature 
intended to repeal the statutory liability of railroads for 
damages assessed by other code provisions, specifically, § 56-1-
11. Finally, the lower court decisions are flawed as contrary to 
sound public policy considerations. 
AT POINT II 
Although the District Court conceded the State might be 
liable, under some circumstances, for injuries occurring at 
"extra-hazardous" crossings, the Court of Appeals foreclosed such 
liability, concluding "that UDOT is immune for its failure to do 
more than minimal warning and control . . . " Duncan v. Union 
Pacific Railroad, 790 P.2d 598 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals finding of governmental immunity 
is unsound. It is contradicted by recent precedent from the Utah 
Supreme Court and other sections of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. It is also poor reasoning to permit a governmental entity 
to get by with only "minimal" precautions at a dangerous railroad 
crossing when it is statutorily mandated to "promote the public 
safety". Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1990). 
AT POINT III 
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Should this Court reject immunity for the State and 
hold the railroad liable for injuries at dangerous crossings, it 
must then find there are disputed issues of material fact as to 
whether or not the Droubay Road intersection is "extra-hazardous" 
requiring Defendants to take additional precautions. Disputed 
facts raised by the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin and Defendants' 
own Affidavits and evidence were more than sufficient to defeat 
the Rule 56 Motions for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Undisputed evidence in our case reveals Union Pacific 
and the State had knowledge of a dangerous condition at the 
Droubay Road rail crossing. Tooele County officials had 
requested numerous inspections of the crossing with an eye toward 
enhancing inadequate warning devices. Although UDOT could have 
ordered the railroad to cover installation costs, placement of 
automatic crossing gates was deferred until federal funding was 
available. This delay was in spite of the recommendations from 
Union Pacific representatives and members of the surveillance 
teams. 
Yet, as a result of the Court of Appeals opinion in 
Duncan, the families of four people who died in a train collision 
at the crossing have been unjustly denied compensation. The 
opinion obligates Union Pacific to simply clear vegetation from 
areas around its tracks and the State must only provide minimally 
effective warning signs on the public road. Thus, free from fear 
11 
of being joined in suits for inadequate warning devices, the 
State and railroad can sit by and do nothing while on notice of 
dangerous conditions imperiling the public. The Supreme Court 
must redefine the duties of the respective Defendants with regard 
to improving railroad crossing safety and grant these injured 
Plaintiffs the remedy they so aptly deserve. 
12 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED THE RAILROAD'S DUTIES TO 
MAINTAIN SAFE RAILROAD CROSSINGS. 
Without any support from prior precedent, whether from 
Utah or other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals in Duncan made 
all railroads within the State free from any concerns of 
negligence for unsafe conditions at crossings regardless of 
notice and requests to cure. Though this ruling is no doubt 
widely heralded by railroads, it is contrary to reason, long-
standing statutory and case law precedent and violative of good 
public policy. The Supreme Court is compelled to reverse the 
Court of Appeals in this instance and restore the law to former 
sound principles. 
A. DESPITE UDOTfS AUTHORITY, UNION PACIFIC CONTINUES TO BE 
LIABLE FOR DANGEROUS CONDITIONS AT RAILWAY CROSSINGS. 
In a long line of cases commencing with English v. 
Southern Pacific Company, 45 P.2d 47 (Utah 1896) this Court 
embraced the common law duty imposed upon a railroad to adopt 
such reasonable measures for the public safety as common prudence 
may dictate in considering dangers at crossings. See also, 
Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 488 P.2d 738 (Utah 1971). 
Despite the absence of any Utah Supreme Court opinion absolving 
the railroad of this longstanding duty, the Court of Appeals in 
Duncan rejected liability on the grounds that Utah Code Ann. § 
54-4-15.1 had somehow pre-empted the field. There is no support 
for this proposition in either the cited statute or existing case 
law. 
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Although UDOT is given authority to "provide for the 
installing, maintaining, reconstructing and improving of 
automatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at 
grade crossings" pursuant to the foregoing statute, there is no 
indication that the legislature intended for that authority to be 
"exclusive" and in derogation of the railroad's traditional 
obligations. In fact, when Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15 was amended 
in 1975, the term "exclusive" was deleted when empowering UDOT to 
determine what safety precautions were required at crossings, 
while subsection (4) was added to retain the Public Service 
Commission's "exclusive" jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising 
from UDOT's actions in determining appropriate safeguards. 
Other provisions of the Public Utilities Act maintain 
the notion that the railroad has continuing duties to improve 
railroad crossings. The Act still obligates Union Pacific to 
share costs of warning precautions at crossings. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-4-15.3 (1990). See also, Duncan, 790 P.2d 597, n. 11. 
Furthermore, § 54-4-16 requires the railroad to investigate and 
file a report on any accident which occurs at a crossing. 
The result reached by the Court of Appeals in this case 
is also contradicted by statutory duties and liabilities imposed 
upon Union Pacific under Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (1990) which 
states: 
Every railroad company shall be liable for 
damages caused by its neglect to make and 
maintain good and sufficient crossings at 
points where any line traveled crosses its 
road. 
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There was neither an explicit or implicit repeal of this 
provision (in effect since 1898) when the legislature enacted the 
Public Utilities Act under which Union Pacific seeks protection. 
Though Plaintiffs relied upon this Code provision, the Appeals 
Court didn't address the issues raised by 56-1-11 nor did it 
attempt to harmonize the potentially inconsistent statutes. See, 
VanWaaoner v. Union Pacific, 186 P.2d 293 (Utah 1947) 
(Identically worded predecessor to § 56-1-11 imposed civil 
liability on railroad for injuries which occur from negligent 
breach of duty to maintain safe crossing). 
In view of the express language of § 54-4-15.1, other 
statutory authority and the clear and unequivocal holdings of 
numerous Supreme Court opinions, the Court of Appeals and 
District Court committed error in finding that Union Pacific had 
no legal responsibility for adequate warning devices at railroad 
crossings. 
It seems curious that, if the legislature 
really intended the crucial and sweeping 
changes the railroad suggests, it would do so 
in the manner and at the place suggested. The 
rules governing negligence claims arising from 
railroad crossing accidents were long and 
painstaking in development. The cases, and the 
rules derived from them date from early 
statehood. The change perceived by the 
railroad would shift responsibility, and 
presumably tort liability, from railroads to 
the public. . . [W]e are persuaded that the 
statute does not serve the railroad as a 
defense to plaintiff's assertion in this suit. 
Sullivan v. Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co., 326 N.W.2d 
320, 323 (Iowa 1982) (a railroad cannot hide behind authority of 
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Department of Transportation to determine the use of warning 
devices and signs at hazardous crossings in derogation of common 
law duties). 
B. EVEN IF UDOT HAD SOLE AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE WARNING 
DEVICES, UNION PACIFIC IS STILL NOT FREE FROM LIABILITY. 
Although this is a case of first impression before the 
Utah Supreme Court, appellate courts from numerous other 
jurisdictions have found a railroad has ongoing civil liability 
for injuries sustained in crossing accidents attributable to 
inadequate warning devices regardless of state authority and 
regulation over grade crossings. 
It is undisputed that most, if not all, states have 
enacted pervasive statutory schemes granting their respective 
transportation departments authority to determine the appropriate 
method to safeguard the public at railroad crossings as Utah did 
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-1, et seq. They serve the salutary 
purposes of uniformity within the state's transportation system 
and avoids duplication by placing all of the responsibility 
within one governmental agency. 
It is the desire and intent of the Division of 
Safety to meet its legal obligations under 
"Utah's Transportation Act" in protecting the 
safety of all those who travel in or through 
the state, while ensuring reasonable and fair 
implementation of safety regulations that will 
economically protect the industries and the 
public. 
LeGRAND 0. JONES, REGULATORY TRANSPORTATION SAFETY, a White 
Paper, for the Utah Department of Transportation. These 
objectives are also consistent with policies fostered under the 
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Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act, codified at 45 U.S.C. 
§ 421, et seq. Yet, in spite of state authority over railroad 
crossings, state and federal appellate courts have uniformly, 
until Duncan, refused to discharge railroads from their 
traditional duties. 
Illustrative is the case of Stevens v. Norfolk & 
Western Railway Co., 357 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. App. 1976). There, the 
applicable statute provided: 
Automatic Train Activated Warning Signals. . . 
The authority of the [Public Service 
Commission] to require the installation of such 
signals shall be exclusive and shall supercede 
such power of any other state or local 
governmental agency. 
IC 1971, 8-6-7.7-2 (Burns Supp. 1976). Nonetheless, the court 
found: 
[T]hat a railroad can be found negligent not 
only in the manner in which it operates its 
trains, but also, once it is determined under 
all the circumstances that a grade crossing is 
extra-hazardous, it can then be found negligent 
in its failure to adequately protect the public 
from danger by providing warnings and taking 
safety precautions in addition to those 
required by statute, and despite the absence of 
a public service commission determination that 
the crossing is extra-hazardous. 
Id. at 4. 
Similarly, in Harrison v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad 
Co., 413 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. App. 1987) the statute permitted only 
authorized officials of the State Road Commission could place 
highway traffic signs, including railroad warning signs at any 
given crossing. M.C.L. § 257.615; M.S.A. § 9.2315. 
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In other words, defendants cannot erect 
additional crossing signs without proper 
permission. . . however, apart from the above 
provisions, defendants still have the common 
law duty of due care. [citation omitted] That 
duty includes petitioning the proper 
authorities when the railroad or the county 
considers warning devices at a dangerous 
crossing to be insufficient, so that the 
situation can be remedied. 
Id. at 431. Among other states where a railroad has been found 
negligent for inadequate warning devices at a crossing 
irrespective of state regulation are Illinois, Stromquist v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc., 444 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983); 
Iowa, Karl v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.. 880 F.2d 68 (8th 
Cir. 1989); Florida, Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co. v. Louallen, 
479 S.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1985), and; Montana, Runkle v. Burlington 
Northern, 613 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1982) (also rejecting a pre-emption 
of the railroad's duties premised upon the Federal-Aid Highway 
Act of 1973) . 
Requiring a railroad to seek governmental approval to 
erect appropriate warning devices at a crossing is reasonable in 
view of the scant public resources available to correct dangerous 
conditions. As our facts illustrate, installation of upgrades 
must often wait two or three years before state or federal funds 
become available. During the waiting period a hazardous 
condition persists and grave or fatal accidents can result. 
Hence, when a railroad is on notice of a hazardous crossing, it 
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must take action and not merely depend on governmental 
intervention.3 
The precise argument posed by Plaintiffs here was 
adopted by the federal district court in McMinn v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 716 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). There, similar to 
the above, the state statute prevented the railroad from 
effecting a change in warning devices at the crossing without 
approval of state authorities. Still the court found the 
railroad was under a duty to petition the appropriate agency to 
change conditions and if an upgrade was refused, that refusal 
must be challenged in an appropriate manner, including resolution 
through litigation or discontinuing service along the line. 
In this case it is especially inappropriate for 
the railroad to seek to absolve itself of 
liability on this ground because it was hardly 
vigorous in its effort to persuade the 
appropriate regulatory authorities that changes 
should be made at the crossing. 
Id. at 127. 
In totally discharging Union Pacific from liability for 
accidents which occur as a result of inadequate warnings at 
crossings, the Court of Appeals in Duncan not only ruled contrary 
to clear statutory and case law authority within the State of 
Union Pacific1s and the State's heavy reliance on this 
purported lack of federal funding should carry little weight with 
the court. Utah Code Ann. 54-4-15.3 directs UDOT to apportion 
the cost of installation or improvement of signals between the 
railroad, public agencies and even the county. Here, Union 
Pacific did, in fact, pay for the crossing improvements by 
performing construction work. (R. 298-299) . 
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Utah but also that of other jurisdictions construing similar 
statutory schemes for crossing regulation. 
C. RELIEVING THE RAILROAD FROM LIABILITY FOR CROSSING SAFETY IS 
CONTRARY TO SOUND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. 
1. Defendant Union Pacific must sometimes Act to Cure 
Dangerous Conditions without regard to purely Monetary 
Considerations. 
One of the principles expressed in the above cases is 
the court's refusal to permit a railroad to sit idly by and await 
governmental action when it is on notice of dangerous conditions 
at a railroad crossing. With all due respect, government action 
is frequently slow or even non-existent. In light of its duties 
to protect the traveling public, railroads must sometimes prod 
the government into action or face liability for the tragic 
consequences which result from dangerous conditions. This was 
precisely the ruling of the 8th Circuit in the case of Brown v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 703 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1983). 
In Brown, local government officials had on two 
occasions requested the railroad to install or upgrade safety 
devices at the Laurel Street railroad crossing. These requests 
were refused. Finally, in 1976, an Arkansas Highway Department 
surveillance team recommended that warning bells and flashing 
lights be installed by applying a "hazardous rating index11. 
However, because state and federal funds were unavailable and the 
railroad would not, at its expense, install safety devices, the 
crossing went unprotected until, in 1979, the subject fatal 
accident occurred. 
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On the basis of those almost identical facts, the 8th 
Circuit upheld the trial court's award of punitive damages 
against the railroad. 
Punitive damages may be imposed upon a 
defendant who knew or had reason to know that 
its course of conduct was about to inflict 
injury but who nonetheless continued on this 
course with a conscious indifference to the 
consequences. 
Brown, 703 F.2d 1052. The Circuit Court refused to condone 
Missouri Pacific's policy determination "that it is cheaper to be 
sued than to protect railroad crossings." Id., 1053. Finally, 
although the Court considered the presence of federal and state 
funding of crossing improvement relevant in determining the 
railroad's liability, it found that this did not excuse Missouri 
Pacific's duties. 
As the Brown opinion states, a railroad's determination 
not to upgrade warning devices, and in turn this Court's decision 
on imposing liability therefor, cannot be guided entirely by the 
funding considerations relied on by Union Pacific and the Court 
of Appeals. Rather, this Court should impose liability on Union 
Pacific when a failure to maintain adequate warning devices 
results in injury to the public. When, as here, the railroad is 
on notice of dangerous conditions, action must be taken 
regardless of federal or state funding issues. 
2. The Court of Appeals has Adopted an Unworkable Standard 
as to the Respective Responsibilities of the Parties to 
Cure Dangerous Crossing Conditions. 
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In assessing Union Pacific's duties with respect to 
crossing warning devices, this Court must avoid the confusing 
territorial notions espoused by the Court of Appeals in Duncan 
and Gleave and promote the primary policy concern of public 
protection. 
In Gleave,4 the first appellate decision construing the 
railroad's responsibilities since enactment of § 54-4-15.1, the 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the common law principles originally 
stated in English, to wit: 
[The railroad] cannot ignore the public peril 
at a more than ordinarily hazardous crossing 
and excuse itself until UDOT takes action to 
upgrade the safety devices at the . . . 
crossing. Rio Grande remains subject to a 
standard of reasonable care which, under the 
circumstances at this crossing, could require 
actions to reduce the risks imposed on the 
public. 
Gleave, 749 P.2d 664. Yet, in Duncan the Court of Appeals 
appears to retreat from the foregoing principles by simply 
requiring the railroad to reduce vegetation which might obstruct 
a motorist's view.5 In so doing, Judge Bullock defines the 
railroad's duties in terms of territorial limits, an unworkable 
standard. 
Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 
749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988). 
5
 Although Gleave was cited for this proposition, its facts 
suggest broader responsibilities of the railroad. One of the 
facts there relied on by Plaintiffs was D&RGW's failure to 
supplement a stop sign it placed at the crossing. 
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Simply put, the railroad must purge its right-of-way of 
hazardous conditions while UDOT is responsible for public roads 
including signage thereon. What is absent is the traditional 
interaction between State authorities and the railroad to correct 
crossing deficiencies. The State can await Federal funds and the 
railroad, while on notice of the dangers, shrug its shoulders and 
place blame on an immune governmental authority. In the 
meantime, the traveling public is exposed to the hazard. This is 
an unfortunate result which cannot be condoned by this Court. 
Through this review, the Supreme Court is respectfully urged to 
return to the laudable policy concerns addressed in English and 
other Utah precedent which hold railroads, such as Union Pacific, 
liable for maintenance at crossings, including installation of 
adequate warning devices. 
POINT II 
THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD NOT BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR 
INJURIES CAUSED BY INADEQUATE WARNINGS AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS. 
Relying largely on this Courtfs decision in Velasquez 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970), the 
Court of Appeals in Gleave and Duncan found UDOTfs decision not 
to upgrade warning devices at railroad crossings immune from 
liability as the exercise of a "discretionary function" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a) (1990). Although the Court of 
Appeals was bound by Velasquez, the Supreme Court has the 
opportunity to re-evaluate and overrule that authority in view of 
twenty years of subsequent sovereign immunity decisions. 
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A. RECENT CASES EXPRESS THE POLICY OF EXPANDING THE STATEfS 
LIABILITY. 
A constant theme of this Court's recent interpretations 
of the Governmental Immunity Act is an expansion of liability on 
the part of the Stare of Utah. 
The policy and legislative intent behind the 
act is to . . . allow more innocent victims 
injured by tortious conduct on the part of the 
public entities access to the courts for 
redress. Fewer such people will be mercilessly 
and senselessly barred from recovery for their 
injuries sustained at the hands of the entities 
designed to serve them. 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 
1980). This rule should apply with particular force where the 
State has expressly assumed duties formerly those of a private 
entity (the Union Pacific Railroad) as occurred by the 
legislature's enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 (1990). On 
our facts, the State has blurred the distinction between 
governmental functions and those traditionally performed by the 
private sector. See, Standiford, 604 P.2d at 1232 and 1233. In 
assuming these responsibilities, the State must assume associated 
liabilities as well. 
As discussed above, the Court of Appeals decision in 
Duncan effectively precludes an injured party from recovering for 
any injuries incurred as a result of inadequate warning devices 
at railroad crossings. In so doing, it ignored the "important 
substantive right11 of a plaintiff to be compensated for his 
losses. "It is thus essential that the defendant be made to pay 
damages and they be equal to plainitfffs loss." Condemarin v. 
24 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) quoting, R. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, § 6.12 at 143 (1972). 
The expansive freedom from suit granted the State of 
Utah under Duncan is also contrary to another tort principle 
espoused in Condemarin, that of deterrence. Although 
traditionally the courts have been slow to recognize the 
importance of deterring negligent conduct on the part of the 
government, it is now widely accepted that even the sovereign 
must be admonished against committing further negligent acts by 
holding the State liable for dangerous conditions it helps 
create. This weighs heavily in favor of liability and against 
allowing the State a governmental immunity defense in our case. 
B. THE STATE OF UTAH HAS EXPRESSLY WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR 
ACCIDENTS WHICH OCCUR AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS. 
In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
decisions made by the State as to railroad crossing warning 
devices were the exercise of a "discretionary function'1 immune 
from suit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a). By so 
holding, Justice Ellett implicitly ruled that discretionary 
function immunity took priority over the express immunity waiver 
set forth in 63-30-8 under which the plaintiff sought recovery. 
That section of the Immunity Act (which seems directly applicable 
to hazardous rail crossings) states, in pertinent part: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for any injury caused by a defective, 
unsafe or dangerous condition of any highway, . 
. . or other structure located thereon. 
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As this ruling is contrary to subsequent opinions of the Court, 
it is submitted that Velasquez has been overruled, sub silentio, 
as the foundation for the sovereign immunity decision in the 
present case. As a result, a reversal of the District and 
Appeals Court decisions in Duncan is warranted and a remand for 
trial on the State's negligence justified. 
In Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) and 
Biqelow v. Ingersol, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court 
found that the express immunity waiver of § 63-30-8 was not 
modified by discretionary function immunity pursuant to § 63-30-
10(1)(a). This is consistent with general rules of statutory 
construction which state that in the event of an inconsistency, 
specific provisions govern over more general terms.6 It also 
undercuts the rationale behind Velasquez. Hence, regardless of 
whether the State is exercising a "discretionary function," when 
its decision pertains to highway improvement, immunity is 
expressly abrogated. 
The Duncan opinion has only added to the confusion 
which results from an attempt to interpret all of these immunity 
cases on highway and railroad crossing issues. This Court should 
use this opportunity to clarify the law on this question and find 
the State of Utah liable on our facts. 
The principle that express waivers of immunity as set 
forth in § 63-30-8, for instance, govern over immunity grants, 
such as "discretionary function" immunity under 63-30-10 (1) (a), 
was recently reiterated in Hanson v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah June 15, 1990). 
26 
C. EVEN IF DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY STILL APPLIES, THE 
DECISION TO IMPROVE WARNING DEVICES IS "OPERATIONAL", NOT 
"POLICY-MAKING." 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that immunity under 
63-30-10 (1) (a) is not modified by the express waiver in 63-30-8, 
the decision to upgrade warning devices at the Droubay Road 
crossing is still not an act or omission on the part of the State 
immune from suit as it is not the exercise of a "discretionary 
function." Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 
P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). 
As discussed above, it is difficult if not impossible, 
to reconcile Velasquez with the more recent immunity decisions in 
Bigelow, Bowen7 and Richards. In Duncan, the Court of Appeals 
added to that confusion by stating "the government is not liable 
in tort for its failure to better maintain or to enhance the 
signage" or "for its failure to do more than minimal warning and 
control". Duncan, 790 P.2d 601 and 602, respectively. These 
bewildering attempts to contrast Bowen and Richards with Gleave 
and Velasquez is highlighted by Judge Jackson in his concurring 
opinion. At least part of this confusion results from a flawed 
attempt to categorize UDOT!s decision as to warning devices at 
crossings as "policy-making" as distinguished from "operational." 
Aside from their rulings on application of 63-30-8, 
Richards and Bigelow clearly held that decisions as to the design 
of traffic control systems (presumably including warning devices 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
27 
at railroad crossings) take place at the operational level as 
distinguished from the policy-making level and hence do not 
constitute the exercise of a "discretionary function.f! Bigelow 
v. Incrersol, 618 P.2d 53. That the decision to upgrade warning 
devices is operational, not policy making, is consistent with the 
UDOT prioritization procedures. 
On our facts, the UDOT surveillance team will inspect a 
given railroad crossing and through application of a purely 
mathematical formula, arrive at a "hazard rating index'1. Those 
crossings which fall at a certain level receive priority and 
funding and those which fall below that level must await later 
funding or some other change in conditions. Here, UDOT 
recommended installation of automatic crossing gates at Droubay 
Road in 1981, prior to the Duncan accident, but the request for 
funding from the federal government was deferred. This deferral 
was "implementive" under the standards in Biqelow and 
consequently not immune. 
UDOTfs decision not to install automatic crossing gates 
at Droubay Road prior to the Duncan accident is not a 
discretionary act under the criteria set forth in Little, 667 
P.2d 49. The court there held that to be purely discretionary, 
an act by the state must be affirmed under four preliminary 
questions: 
(1) Does a challenged act, omission or decision 
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, 
program or objective? 
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(2) Is the questioned act, omission or decision 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of 
the policy program or objective as opposed to one 
which would not change the course or direction of 
the policy, program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission or decision require the 
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and 
expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the 
requisite, constitutional, statutory or lawful 
authority and duty to make the challenged act, 
omission, or decision? 
Id. at 51. It is submitted that the determination here at issue 
fails at least two of these standards. 
First, the alleged negligent conduct in this case - the 
manner of warning the public - was not "essential to the 
realization or accomplishment of a governmental policy.11 Irvine 
v. Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989). Secondly, the 
recommendation to upgrade warning devices was in the nature of a 
professional judgment, not policy making. Abbett v. County of 
St. Louis, 424 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. App. 1988) (decision on where to 
install guardrail pursuant to standard enunciated in highway 
manual does not involve policy making protected under 
discretionary function immunity). See also, Ostendorf v. Kenyon, 
347 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. App. 1984) (Placement of warning signs on 
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highway not a discretionary act where state had ntoice of 
dangerous condition which could be improved by additional or 
better signs). 
This analysis is consistent with the decision reached 
in Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47 (Ala. 1981). There, the 
plaintiff brought a negligent action against the state alleging, 
among other claims, a failure to provide adequate warnings at the 
subject railroad crossing. The state argued that the decision on 
the type of warning sign to be utilized was the exercise of a 
"discretionary function." The court rejected the statefs 
position finding that the decision to sign was "operational" and 
hence not immune. See also, Williams v. State, 438 S.2d 781 
(Fla. 1983) (failure to place warning signs at a railroad 
crossing which is known to be dangerous is an operational-level 
function immunity which is waived). 
The continued viability of Velasquez is gravely 
questioned by the Court!s subsequent opinions in Bigelow, Bowen 
and Richards all of which reject a discretionary function 
immunity for the government's decisions as to the design and 
signage at or on public thoroughfares. Without Velasquez, the 
Court of Appeals decision on sovereign immunity in Duncan must 
fall and this case returned to the District Court. 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT FINDS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT THE RAILROAD 
HAD A DUTY WITH RESPECT TO WARNING DEVICES AND THE STATE 
IS NOT IMMUNE THIS CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR TRIAL. 
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It is conceivable that the court could reject sovereign 
immunity for the State and hold Union Pacific liable for 
inadequate warnings at crossings yet affirm the summary judgment 
by finding that the Droubay Road crossing was not "extra-
hazardous11 as a matter of undisputed fact. This is not, however, 
a finding which is supported by the facts in our case. 
The question of whether there is something in the 
nature of the railroad crossing to require additional safety 
precautions is traditionally and properly one to be reached by a 
competent jury. Whether a party is negligent in failing to 
provide automatic gates is a material question of fact which is 
almost always disputed by the parties. DeElena v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 592 P.2d 759 (Ariz. 1979); English v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 45 P.2d 47. ("As a general rule it may be said that 
whether ordinary care or reasonable prudence requires a railroad 
company [to take additional precautions] at a crossing that is 
especially dangerous is a question of fact for a jury to 
determine . . .ff 45 P. 2d 50). As with most negligence actions, 
summary judgment should be granted with great caution in an 
action arising out of a crossing accident. Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
In our case there was more than ample evidence to 
premise a finding that the Droubay Road crossing was extra-
hazardous. Plaintiffs offered the affidavit of Robert Crommelin 
who, after performing an on-site inspection of the crossing 
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opined that it was indeed "extra-hazardous." In rendering this 
opinion he relied upon: 
(a) actual and projected traffic volume on the 
roadway, including school buses. 
(b) train volume and speed. 
(c) angle of the crossing, 43°.8 
(d) placement of existing warning signs at 300' and 51 
away from the crossing. 
(e) evidence of other accidents at the crossing.10 
By application of the above factors in a hazard rating index, 
Crommelin arrived at the conclusion that the crossing did warrant 
additional safeguards, specifically automatic crossing gates. 
In order to grant Defendants1 Motions for Summary 
Judgment, Judge Hanson struck or refused to consider the 
Crommelin Affidavit mistakenly finding that his testimony lacked 
an adequate foundation. (R. 484). This was because Crommelin 
had relied, in part, on information contained in surveillance 
team inspection reports, which Defendants offered through the 
Affidavits of Ross Wilson, Lillian Witkowsky, Woodrow Burnham and 
Duncan Silver. 
"This angle makes it extremely difficult for motorists to 
judge the speed, distance and approach of trains nearing the 
crossing." (R. at 189) 
9
 "Federal standards clearly mandate that such sign are to 
be 7501 in advance of a crossing in a rural area." (R. at 188). 
10
 As of the date of the Duncan accident, there had been 
three similar accidents at the crossing. 
32 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does require 
an affiant to base his opinion upon specific facts. However, 
when the affiant is an expert witness, those specific facts need 
not be independently admissible so long as they are of the sort 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field and are 
trustworthy and reliable. Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence. See 
also, In re: Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. 
Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) construing the similarly worded 
Federal Rules of Procedure and Evidence. As Crommelin was 
relying upon an on-site inspection and the identical facts 
utilized by Defendants' affiants, his testimony should have been 
admitted and considered. As it raised disputed issues of 
material fact concerning the hazardous condition of the crossing, 
summary judgment should have been denied. 
Even without the Crommelin Affidavit, there is ample 
evidence from which to find a disputed issue of material fact on 
the question of the crossing being "extra-hazardous." 
Defendants1 own UDOT surveillance team reports recommending 
automatic crossing gates reveal the State and railroad had notice 
of dangerous conditions but nonetheless failed to take curative 
actions simply because "federal funds were unavailable." And, 
though evidence of prior accidents is inadmissible for purposes 
of proving negligence, it is admissible to show the existence of 
a danger or defect. Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982. 
And, the fact that automatic gates were ultimately installed by 
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the State and railroad impeachs Defendants1 testimony that the 
crossing was not "extra-hazardous." 
In this case, exper4, i testified for the 
railroad that the crossing was not extra-
hazardous. The fact that automatic signals 
were installed on the crossing after the 
accident would have been relevant for the 
purpose of impeachment as well as feasibility. 
Id. at 987. See also, Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In granting the Motions for Summary Judgment, the 
District Court improperly struck Plaintiffs1 Affidavit and 
ignored evidence of an "extra-hazardous" crossing contained 
within Defendants1 own submissions. Should the court find that 
one or both of the Defendants are liable for inadequate signage 
at railroad crossings, it must remand for a trial on the disputed 
issue of whether the Droubay Road crossing was "extra-hazardous." 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals erred in absolving the Union Pacific Railroad 
from liability as to inadequate warning devices at railroad 
crossings in granting the State of Utah governmental immunity for 
its decisions on upgrading such warning devices. And as there is 
more than sufficient evidence to find the Droubay Road crossing 
"extra-hazardous" as would necessitate additional safeguards, the 
District Court's Summary Judgment must be reversed and this 
matter remanded for purposes of a trial on the merits of the 
negligence claims. 
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The Supreme Court cannot let stand rulings which deny 
worthy Plaintiffs compensation for injuries sustained as a result 
of dangerous conditions created by the Defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this f h day of October, 1990. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
MICHAEL A. KATZ 
Attorneys for AppellTanTs 
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Addenda 
STATUTES 
54-4-15. Grade crossings — Transportation department — 
Commission — Regulation. 
- C j » 
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, high-
way or street at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be 
constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corpora-
tion at grade, nor shall the track of a street railroad corporation be con-
structed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without the per-
mission of the Department of Transportation having first been secured: pro-
vided, that this subsection shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully 
existing tracks. The department shall have the right to refuse its permission 
or to grant it upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe. 
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and prescribe the 
manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installa-
tion, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of one rail-
road by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a 
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad or 
street railroad, and of a'street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or 
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types 
of traffic in the interest of public safety and is vested with power and it shall 
be its duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by school buses 
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where in its 
judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such crossing 
heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which 
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the 
alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall 
be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or 
between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other public 
authority in interest. 
(3) Whenever the department shall find that public convenience and neces-
sity demand the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a 
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of any public utility, 
the department may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establish-
ment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall there-
upon become a public highway and crossing. 
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of 
any dispute upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of the de-
partment pursuant to this section. 
History: L. 1917. ch. 47, art . 4. 5 14: C.L. Cities, power to regulate tracks. § 10-3-33. 
1917, § 4811; R.S. 1933, 76-4-15: L. 1939. ch. Fences, cattle guards and street crossings. 
84.5 1;C. 1943. 76-4-15; L. 1975 U s i S . S . ^ c h . § 10-3-35. 
9, § 17. Flagmen. gTade crossings and drams, 
Cross-References. — Change of grades and § 10-S-36. 
crossings. § 10-8-34. 
54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty of 
transportation department to provide. 
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall 
as prescribed in this act provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstruct-
ing, and improving of automatic arid other safety appliances, signals or de-
vices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of any 
railroad or street railroad corporation in the state. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 118, § 1; 1975 (1st act." referred to in this section, means L. 1973. 
S.S.). ch. 9. $ 18. ch. 118. §§ 1 riirough 4, which appear at }§ 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 54-4-15.1 through 54-4-L5.4. 
54-4-15.2. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Funds 
for payment of costs. 
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall be used m 
conjunction with other available moneys, including those received from fed-
eral sources, to pay all or part of the cost of the installation, maintenance, 
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in 
§ 54-4-15 1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any road over the 
tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in this state 
Histor> L 1973, ch. 118, § 2 
Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
this catchline following § 54-4 15 1 
54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Appor-
tionment of costs by transportation department 
— Liability of cities, towns and counties — 
Claims for payment of costs. 
The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the provisions of 
§ 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance, recon-
struction or improvement of any signals or devices described in § 54-4-15 1 
between the railroad or street railroad and the public agency involved Unless 
otherwise ordered by the department, the liability of cities, towns and coun-
ties to pay the share of maintenance cost assigned to the local agencies by the 
department shall be limited to the funds provided under this act Payment of 
any moneys from the funds provided shall be made on the basis of verified 
claims filed with the Department of TransDortation by the railroad or street 
railroad corporation responsible for the physical installation, maintenance, 
reconstruction or improvement of the signal or device 
Hisiorv L. 1973, ch 118 5 3, 1975 (1st Meaning of "this act" — See note juaer 
S S ), th 9, * 19 this auchlme following * 54-4-15 I 
56-1-11. Maintenance of crossings. 
Eveiy la ihoad company shall be liable foi damages caused by its neglect to 
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road 
History- R.S 1898 & C L 1907, $ 445; C I, Regulation of ciossmgs, <* 10 8 34 et seq 
1917, <j 1237; R S 1933 & C 1943, 77-0-11 Stopping at ciossmgs, duties of buses and 
Cioss-KcfcrcnccH — Gales at crossings, certain tiucks, $ 41 6 97 
* 10 8 83 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any mjuiy 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, load, 
street, alley, ciosswalk, sidewalk, culveit, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, * 8. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990]. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(0 arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) arises out of the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous waste; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or 
seeding for the clearing of fog. 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-10 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the 
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and 
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of 
fourth amendment rights. 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move wi ther without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon tell or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shalLb^e served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party*is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense requi red . Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible M evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, inducting reasonabl^attorney's fees, aniy^yjgHending paVty or, 
Attorney may b e ^ a J ^ M i g ^ t y i p f contempt. 
5 9 4 l I t a h 790 P A C I F I C R E P O R T E R . 2d S E R I E S 
(195.",), the appellant had failed to comply 
with a trial court order in a divorce pro-
ceeding and had been found in contemj t 
The Nevada Supreme Court did not dismiss 
his appeal for failure to comply with the 
j udgmen t below, but held tha t the appeal 
would be dismissed unless the appellant 
within 30 days submit ted himself to the 
process of the trial cour t or posted a super-
sedeas bond. Id. 280 P.2d a t 291. The 
cour t s ta ted ' 
[AJppellant husband is now a fugitive 
from process of the trial court . We shall 
not permit him to avail himself of jud cial 
review while at the same time he places 
himself beyond reach of the process of 
the trial court in defiance of its a t t empts 
to enforce its judgment . . . 
We do but insist tha t one seeking the 
aid of the courts of this s ta te should 
remain th roughout the course of such 
proceeding, amenable to all judicial pro-
cess of the s ta te which may issue in 
connection with such proceeding. 
Id. a t 291 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court con-
sidered an appellate cour t ' s dismissal of a 
civil appeal on the basis tha t the appellant 
was in contempt of the trial cour t ' s order in 
National Union of Marine Cooks & Stew-
ards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct. 92, 99 
L.Ed. 4fi (1954). The Court was asked to 
decide whether the Washington Supreme 
Court violated either the equal protection 
c lause or the due process clause of the 
four teenth amendment when it dismissed 
an appeal from a money judgment as a 
reasonable measure for safeguarding the 
collectibility of tha t judgment . The appel-
lant had filed a notice of appeal, but had 
offered no supersedeas bond and had ob-
tained no s tay of the proceedings. Id. a t 
39, 75 S.Ct. at 93-94. The trial court or-
dered the appellant to deliver certain bonds 
in its possession to the court ' s receiver Tor 
safekeeping pending disposition of the ap-
peal. Id. The appellant refused and was 
held in contempt Id. As a result, the 
Washington Supreme Court s truck the ap-
2. Utah Const art VIII, § S provides, in pert inent 
part "Pxccpt for mat ters filed o n g i n a l h with 
the sup reme court, there shall be in all cases an 
peal on the meri ts , giving the apj "II** & 
days to purge its contempt by delivering 
the bonds. Id. a t 40, 75 S.Ct at 94 H * 
United Sta tes Supreme Court found r»o«* 
stitutional violation, s ta t ing that " ( * £ * » 
s ta tu tory review is important and murt I t 
exercised without discrimination. sucha»> 
view is not a requi rement of due prtw»» 
Id. a t 43, 75 S.Ct. a t 95. The C « * 
stressed tha t " [pe t i t i one r ' s appeal » » ** 
dismissed because of petitioner 's faihtfr* 
satisfy a j udgmen t pending an appeal 6«*> 
it. It was dismissed because of i>etiui*irtl 
failure to comply with the court 's ortofb 
safeguard peti t ioner 's a s se t s from dMffr 
tion pending such appeal ." Id. at H 3 
S.Ct. a t 96. 
We are persuaded tha t the Clomt + 
proach is most consis tent with tb* Vwk 
Supreme Court ' s Tuttle decision and &* 
United Sta tes Supreme Court ' s Arnold I* 
cision. By adopting this approach, wtt* 
not deny appellant her r ight to an afffli 
under Utah Const, a r t . VIII , § 5.1 bu t*** 
er insist she m u s t submit herself !• 6 * 
jurisdiction of the trial court and « J M % 
that court 's concerns before she maj tM* 
cise tha t r ight. She merely ha> iKt Kb 
gation to come forward and offer a reHMfr 
able al ternative to the trial court to id* 
guard her asse t s from dissipation pe*4ig 
her appeal. 
Appellant was given the opi*>rtua^ I* 
post a supersedeas bond, but ha* rttWm 
She has ignored the orders of the Mft 
court and, apa r t from o b t a n m g a W*|* 
rary stay which she allowed to lap** I * 
want of a bond, she has provided ** * * 
sonable a l ternat ive to allow tht* o>*^ % 
insure tha t her a s se t s are available tt> wfl* 
fy the j u d g m e n t pending appeal. B? %*" 
actions, appel lant is f rustrat ing th* arfMN^  
istration of just ice. 
Appellant has not claimed that *fc* # i 
not have the ability to comply with \h* V& 
court ' s order. See Stewart v Strwm^iM 
Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 iHtoH H i 
situation is similar to one faced hj i Ql» 
appeal of right from the court ol <" *:*» 0& 
diction to a court with appellate p*n*B*&1k 
o\cr the cause." 
DUNCAN v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO. 
Cite as 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App 1990) 
Utah 595 
court, where it found it was "dealing 
i bugant who not only has previously 
to appear as ordered, but who up to 
m y time remains a fugitive from jus-
Apparently, he is unwilling to re-
d to a court order with which he dis-
but seeks to obtain on appeal" a 
r favorable result. Tobin v. Casaus, 
CalApp.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 
• t therefore hold that appellant has 30 
«9§£rpfn the date of the issuance of this 
q0taM to bring herself within the process 
4 f * r trial court. If appellant submits 
to the trial court, she should be 
I an opportunity to offer al ternatives 
i trial court to protect the judgment , 
nt may persuade the court it should 
fcftftfW disputed judgment amount in t rus t 
I t f l a resolution of this appeal on the 
• ^ However, if appellant pers is ts in 
herself in violation of the trial 
ft orders, her appeal will be dismissed 
* * f expiration of the 30-day period. 
CAEFF and ORME. JJ . concur. 
Shelly Bowers; S h e r r y Bowers ; Mon ica 
l l enwood. individual ly and as pe r sona l 
representa t ive of ihe Es ta t e of R a m o n 
Henwood, deceased; Phyl l is Hen wood; 
and Owen Henwood , Plaint i f fs and Ap-
pel lants , 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC R A I L R O A D COMPA-
NY, a co rpora t ion ; The Sta te of Utah; 
Pau l Kle inman; and Does 1 t h r o u g h 
100, inclusive, Defendan t s and Respon-
dents . 
No. 890291-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 12, 1990. 
Heirs of victims of train-automobile ac-
cident brought action aga ins t railroad, De-
par tment of Transpor ta t ion and railroad 
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., en tered 
summary judgment dismissing wrongful 
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior Dis-
trict Judge , held that : (1) heirs failed to 
establish that ei ther engineer or railroad 
were negligent, and (2) Depar tment , having 
given a t least some warn ing or control a t 
railroad crossing, was governmental ly im-
mune in deciding whe ther to improve 
means of warning or control a t crossing 
because of fiscal effects of decision. 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., filed a concurr ing opinion. 
• Dt'NCAN, individually and as per-
rtpreaentative of the Es ta te of 
Duncan, deceased; J a s o n E. 
, a minor by and t h r o u g h his 
i ad Litem; Alice Duncan ; No-
Duncan. Michael D u n c a n ; Tim 
Kevin Duncan; Br ian Dun-
: Michelle Bowers, individual ly and 
• t m o n a l representative of the Es t a t e 
<4hAt*y and Nicole Bowers , deceased; 
Bowers; F lorence H a n s o n ; 
1. Ra i l roads <3=>348(1) 
Evidence failed to suppor t claim of 
heirs of accident victims tha t there was 
negligence in operation of train or en t rus t -
ing its operation to engineer who was in 
charge at time of automobile-train collision. 
2. Ra i l roads @=>348(2) 
Evidence did not suppor t claim of heirs 
of accident victims that railroad negligently 
maintained railroad right-of-way a t cross-
ing with s t ree t where train-automobile colli-
sion occurred; there was nothing to indi-
cate what could have made rai lroad's right-
5 9 6 ly tah 790 P A C I F I C REPOKTKK, 2d 5 E K I K S 
of-way safer to motorist crossing since 
path of train was clearly visible to oncom-
ing motorists . 
3. Ra i l roads <£=>303(1) 
Railroad has to r t duty to maintain its 
rights-of-way in condition safe to motorists 
who t raverse them a t established cross-
ings. 
4. Ra i l roads e=»303( I) 
Railroad is required to take precau-
tions to prevent injury to motorists cross-
ing railroad right-of-way if reasonable per-
son in rai l road 's position would take such 
precaut ions 
5. Ra i l r oads ©=303(1) 
In determining what is reasonable un-
der the c i rcumstances for railroad crossing" 
every railroad crossing is hazardous but, 
since it is not practicable to eliminate all 
railroad crossings, simple existence of rail-
road crossing is not in itself a breach of 
duty of care. 
6. Ra i l r oads <3=>303(1) 
For railroad to be liable for crossing 
mishap, there must be something about 
rai lroad's right-of-way tha t crea tes hazard 
to motorist g rea t e r than hazard presented 
by simple fact that railroad and s t ree t in-
tersect . 
7. Ra i l roads 0=303(1) 
Railroad is required to take every rea-
sonable action to a s su re safety of motorist 
who can reasonably be expected to cross 
right-of-way and in determining what is 
reasonable under circumstances of specific 
case, tr ier of fact must ultimately weigh 
burden on railroad, and indirectly on public, 
of requir ing added precautions, against 
benefits tha t would be derived by public at 
large from precautions. 
8. Ra i l roads <S=>307(2, 3) 
It was not responsibility of railroad to 
place signs and devices on public road 
warning motorists of railroad crossing. 
9. S ta tes ®=>112(1) 
Governmental immunity shields sover 
eign policy making and discretion from 
s ta :e law dama?*- claims b \ generally pr<^  
c . I K L " £ <Ms~Ji£t: '.i&t«:.;\> f««r p*rfonr&r.ce • : 
governmenta l function subject to certain 
s ta tutor i ly enumera ted waivers. 
10. Automobi les <S=>277 
Depar tment of Transportat ion enjoyed 
governmental immunity from liability in ac-
tion brought by heirs of train-automobile 
accident victims alleging that safety im-
provements a t railroad crossing were inad-
equa te U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10. 
11. Munic ipal C o r p o r a t i o n s '£='724 
Test for determining governmental im-
munity is whether activity under considera-
tion is of such unique na tu re that it can 
only be performed by governmental agency 
or that it is essential to core of governmen-
tal activity, and under t h a t test, court di-
amines na ture of activity itself, not identity 
of person performing activity. 
12. Automobi les <s=279 
Government may be held liable in tort 
for failure to provide some effective wan-
ing or control for traffic a t city inters** 
tion; however, duty to provide some effer-
tive warning or control must be disU* 
guished from more than minimal maictr 
nance and from enhancement of means of 
providing warning and control. 
13. Automobi les o=>279 
Highways <3=>194 
As long as warn ing or control Mgnaft 
of clear hazard is in existence and maa*-
tained enough to give it minimal effecti** 
ness, government is not liable in tort im 
failure to be t te r maintain or to enhaaot 
s ignage. 
Michael A. Katz (argued), Burbidtf* i 
Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for appellant*, 
J. Clare Williams (argued), Larr\ A (ia* 
lenbein, Salt Lake City, for respond*** 
Union Pacific R. Co. and Paul Kleuuai*. 
Allan L. Larson (argued), Craig Kari**. 
Anne Swenson, Snow, Christensen & Mar* 
neau, Salt Lake City, R. Paul Van l%a\ 
Sta te Atty. Gen., Stephen J S ^ m m 
A<st Atty Gen , Salt Lake Cit\ fur m 
-pondent Sla te of V tah 
IJUHH.AW V. HINI 
Cite as 790 P.2d 
Before BENCH and .JACKSON, JJ. , 
and BULLOCK,' Senior District Judge . 
OPINION 
J ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior District 
Judge. 
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judg-
ment dismissing their wrongful death ac-
tion arising out of a train-automobile colli-
sion. We affirm. 
Droubay Road is a two-lane thorough-
fare running north and south in rural 
Tooele County. At one point, it intersects 
the Union Pacific Railroad tracks a t ap-
proximately a 43-degree angle on the north 
and a 136-degree angle on the south. 
Three roadside signs warn oncoming mo-
tortets of the crossing, one sign located 
about 300 feet from the crossing, and two 
on either side of the road 19 feet from the 
crossing. There are no flashing lights or 
aa«chanical devices a t the crossing to warn 
•f an approaching train, but nothing ob-
structs a motorist's view of the t racks for 
•everal thousand feet. 
On the evening of April 9, 1983, a t about 
la&O p m., a Union Pacific train operated by 
ftwl Kleinman struck an automobile and 
tolled all four occupants of the vehicle a t 
tfce Droubay Road crossing. There is no 
mdence to indicate that the train was neg-
aftntly or improperly operated, and its 
atadlight, warning bells, and whistles were 
activated well in advance of the crossing. 
TV 
engineer, Kleinman, averred that he 
awr the car approach the crossing but be-
hrttd that it would stop When it became 
ajfmrvnt that the car was not going to 
«*•?, it was too late for him to stop the 
tlML 
The Utah Department of Transportation 
COOT) periodically evaluated the Droubay 
fcaad crossing in planning the allocation of 
to np^urces, including federal funding, for 
Htfe-wide highway improvements. Under 
Ataielhods used at the time, the Droubay 
feaad crossing did not rank high enough in 
1 I Robert Bullock, Senioi District Judge, sit 
• m b> special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Odt Ann <» 78-3-24(10) (Supp 1089) 
IFIN PAtint: K. co . Utah 597 
595 (Utah App 1990) 
UDOT's prioritization of the Sta te ' s rail-
road crossings to receive additional safety 
improvements , such as electrified lights 
and crossbars 
The heirs of the accident victims sued 
Union Pacific and engineer Kleinman for 
negligent operation of the train, negligent 
maintenance of the railroad r ight of way a t 
the Droubay Road crossing, and for en-
t rus t ing operation of the train to an alleg-
edly unfit employee. The heirs also sued 
the State , claiming tha t the safety improve-
ments a t the crossing were inadequate. 
All of the defendants moved for summary 
judgment , and the district cour t granted 
their motions and dismissed the complaint. 
Plaintiffs appealed. 
CLAIMS AGAINST UNION PACIFIC 
In defense aga ins t the motions for sum-
mary judgment , the plaintiffs filed an affi-
davit of one Robert Crommelin, a traffic 
safety engineer . In Crommelin 's opinion, 
" the warn ing signs presen t a t the crossing 
were clearly inadequa te" and " the intersec-
tion [was] clearly ' ex t ra hazardous . ' " The 
district court , however, s t ruck Crommelin's 
affidavit on the g rounds tha t 23 U.S.C. 
§ 409 (Supp. 1989) forbade admission into 
evidence of the factual basis for Cromme-
lin's conclusions, and Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e) permits only affidavits 
which s t a t e "such facts as would be admis-
sible in evidencel.J" Crommelin 's opinion 
was based partly on information gained 
from UDOT's records of the Droubay Road 
crossing. To facilitate candor in adminis-
trat ive evaluat ions of h ighway safety haz-
ards, 23 U.S.C. § 409 prevents a court from 
receiving records of such evaluat ions into 
evidence.2 Therefore, under this federal 
s ta tu te , the documents from which 
Crommelin obtained a large pa r t of the 
data used in reaching his conclusions were 
inadmissible. 
On tha t basis, the district cour t s t ruck 
Crommelin's affidavit. However, the dis-
2. The legislative purpose of section 409 can be 
gleaned from H.Conf Rep. No. 100-^7. 104th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 172-173, reprinted in 1987 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin News 66, 156-57. 
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trict court also ruled that, even if the affi-
davit were considered, the case should be 
dismissed on its merits. Faced with these 
alternative grounds for the same result, we 
choose on appeal in this case to rest our 
decision on the merits. We will thus take 
Crommelin's opinion at face value. 
11] Even if Crommelin's affidavit is con-
sidered, plaintiffs did not show that Union 
Pacific breached any duty of care in the 
collision at the Droubay Road crossing. 
Plaintiffs alleged negligence in the opera-
tion of the train by Kleinman and, through 
respondent superior, by Union Pacific, as 
well- as negligence by Union Pacific in em-
ploying an unfit train operator and in main-
taining its right of way. Plaintiffs also 
sought punitive damages from Union Pacif-
ic for willful and reckless conduct. Plain-
tiffs introduced no evidence to show that 
the train was negligently operated, much 
less that the collision was willfully and 
recklessly caused, and no evidence to show 
that Kleinman was unfit to operate the 
train. Kleinman avers that he operated the 
train properly. Of course, Kleinman's tes-
timony is biased, and there are no known 
witnesses surviving the crash other than 
Union Pacific employees. Nevertheless, 
lacking any evidence to the contrary, we 
conclude that plaintiffs failed to show neg-
ligence in operating the train or in entrust-
ing its operation to Kleinman.3 
r(2] The only claim against Union Pacif-
ic on which evidence was introduced was 
the claim for negligent maintenance of the 
railroad right of way, which is supported, 
from plaintiffs' point of view, by Cromme-
lin's affidavit. We therefore proceed to 
consider this claim. 
[31 It is settled that a railroad has a 
tort duty to maintain its rights of way in a 
3. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382. 1385 (Utah 1989); 
Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co, 
771 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
4. Cleave v Denver & Rio Grande W R R. Co.. 
749 P 2d 660. 662-64 (Utah Ct.App 1988) 
5. Wilde v. Denver A Rw Grande W R R. Co., No. 
C-83-149J, slip op. at 16. 1985 W U 7 3 7 0 (D.Ut. 
April 3. 1985) 
condition safe to motorists who traverse 
them at established crossings.4 However, 
there seems to be a lack of clarity about 
the standard of care required of the rail-
road in the observance of this duty, and 
this apparent lack of clarity has led to 
some criticism of the Utah standard of care 
as it was understood.5 Since we must ap-
ply a standard of care in determining 
whether Union Pacific breached its duty, 
we attempt to state clearly the extent to 
which a railroad must make its right of 
way safe for motorists to cross. 
[4] The confusion concerning the stan-
dard of care centers in the meaning of the 
words "more than ordinarily hazardous," 
which were used in applying the standard 
of care in two Utah cases, Bridges v. Vn-
ion Paeifie R.R. Co., 26 Utah 2d 281. 488 
P.2d 738 (1971), and English v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47 (1896L 
These words were never intended to impose 
a standard of care higher thin ordinary 
care, the degree of care exercised by i 
reasonable person under the circumstanc-
es.* Thus, the railroad is required to take 
precautions to prevent injury to crossing 
motorists if a reasonable person in the rail-
road's position would take such precau-
tions.7 
[5, 61 In determining what is reasonable 
under the circumstances of a railroad 
crossing, it is obvious that every railroad 
crossing is hazardous, but, since it is wrt 
practicable to eliminate all railroad crow-
in gs, the simple existence of a railroad 
< rossing is not in itself a breach of a Juty 
of care. Much of everyday life present! 
hazards; driving or walking along a street 
are hazardous, and so are stairs, electricity, 
and many other things, but we toleralf 
those hazards because of the impractical 
ty of eliminating them. In determifwf 
6. English, 45 P. at 50. 
7. See Meese v. Brigham Young Vntv. 63^ tM 
720 (Utah 1981); Wlittman v. W.T. Grant L+.* 
Utah 2d 81. 395 P.2d 918 (1964); Restaie«Si 
(Second) of Torts § 283 (196S). 
DUNCAN v. UNK1 
Cite ax 790 P.2d 5 
whether a mishap involving one of those 
Hazards is tortious, the question is not 
whether a hazard existed, but rather 
whether, under prevailing community stan-
dards, the defendant should bear the re-
sponsibility to discover and ameliorate a 
hazard, in light of the practicability of do-
ng so and the costs and benefits to society 
of requiring the defendant so to act.8 In 
the case of railroad crossings, the cost of 
eliminating the hazard, such as by install-
ing overpasses at all railroad crossings, 
ncluding rural ones, does not warrant a 
duty of care so rigorous that simply having 
a railroad cross a street is tortious. Rath-
er, for a railroad to be liable for a crossing 
saishap, there must be something about the 
railroad's right of way that creates a haz-
ard to motorists greater than the hazard 
presented by the simple fact that the rail-
road and the street intersect. 
IT J In determining what is reasonable 
ID require of a railroad in its tort liability 
for crossings, it would thus be error to hold 
that the railroad right of way cannot cross 
• street. However, for such a crossing, the 
nilroad is required to take every reason-
able action to assure the safety of motor-
ics who can reasonably be expected to 
cross the right of way. In determining 
what is reasonable under the circumstances 
rf a speciiic case, the trier of fact must 
•Itonately .veigh the burden on the rail-
raad, and indirectly on the public, of requir-
es; added precautions, against th? benefits 
tisat would be derived by the public at large 
from such precautions For example, in 
fte Gleave case," wild vegetation on the 
f%ht of way obscured oncoming trains 
from motorists at the crossing. The cost 
tf removing or maintaining the vegetation 
wis minimal compared to the enormous 
wttefit to the public of being able to see an 
^Uroaching train at a frequent crossing. 
% See hrtckwn v. Walgteen Drug Co., 120 Utah 
I t 232 P 2d 210, 31 A L R 2d 177(1951); Wag 
mm v Waterside, lm , 744 P.2d 1012, 1013 
ftWi App 1987) 
* Cltmw v Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 
* * P 2 d 660. 662-64 (Utah 1988) 
N PACIFIC R. CO. Utah 5 9 9 
>5 (Utah App 1990) 
The imposition of a tort duty on the rail-
road to remove or maintain the vegetation 
was therefore clearly correct. 
(81 In this case, there is nothing to indi-
cate what could have made Union Pacific's 
right of way safer to motorists crossing on 
Droubay Road. The path of the train is 
clearly visible to oncoming motorists. 
Plaintiffs suggest that Union Pacific 
should have placed warning signs and de-
vices on Droubay Road, including automat-
ic gates blocking traffic on the Road from 
crossing the tracks when a train was ap-
proaching. It is not, however, the respon-
sibility of the railroad to place signs and 
devices on the public road. The railroad 
must maintain its own right of way, but it 
is not under any duty to place signs or 
devices on the public road. 
The design and maintenance of state 
roads and the control of traffic on state 
roads are UDOT's responsibilities and pre-
rogatives.10 At common law, this responsi-
bility at railroad crossings was shared with 
the railroad.1' Thus, in English, the rail-
road was found liable for failing to flag 
motorists on an intersecting city street. 
Since English, however, UDOT has been 
established, and the Legislature invested 
UDOT with "power to determine and pre-
scribe the manner of . . . protection of 
each crossing." ,2 Although that responsi-
bility in no way reduces the railroad's re-
sponsibility to maintain its right of way,13 it 
would nevertheless, under ordinary circum-
stances, place the railroad in the role of 
meddler, trespasser, or usurper if the rail-
road were to put signs on the public road 
or forbid traffic on the public road from 
crossing its right of way. Union Pacific 
therefore had no duty to place signs or 
roadblocking devices on Droubay Road, 
11. Although we hold that the ra i l road does not 
have au thon ty 01 icsponsibi l i ty to place signs or 
roadblocks on the public road, we note that the 
cost of protecting users of the public road con-
tinues !o be shared with the rai l road pursuan t 
to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.3 (1990). 
12. Utah Code Ann § 54-4-15(2) (1990). 
Wk l u h Code Ann. § S4-4-15 1 (1990) 13. Gleave, 749 P 2d at 664 
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and it is not liable in tort for its failure to 
do so. 
CLAIMS ACiAINST UDOT 
(9,101 Governmental immunity is 
UDOT's principal defense11 against plain-
tiffs. Governmental immunity shields sov-
ereign policy-making and discretion from 
state-law damage claims by generally pre-
cluding damage liability for performance of 
a governmental function, subject to certain 
statutorily enumerated waivers.15 
Resolution of the governmental immuni-
ty question in this case is controlled by 
Cleave, which held that UDOT was govern-
mentally immune in determining the pre-
cise method to be used in warning persons 
on a public road approaching a railroad 
crossing. We follow Gleave, and hold that 
UDOT is immune in this case. We add, 
however, a few comments to address the 
particular arguments of counsel in this 
case. 
I l l ] Plaintiffs cite Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) in an at-
tempt to avoid governmental immunity. In 
Bowen, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
a summary judgment in favor of Riverton 
in a tort action. Bowen asserted that a 
stop sign at a busy Riverton intersection 
was lying on the ground as Bowen and 
another vehicle collided in the intersection. 
14. Wc logically do not reach the affirmative 
defense of governmental immuni ty wi thout first 
de te rmin ing or p resuming that a plaintiff has 
established a p r ima facie case. See Ferree v. 
State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). How-
ever, while UDOT's p r ima facie liability was 
perhaps implicitly p tesumed in the district 
cout t ' s reasoning, the district court did not ex-
pressly review plaintiffs' p r ima facie claim 
against UDOT. We are reluctant to delve into 
an issue on which the t i ial court has not ex 
pressly ruled, for the reasons explained in Zions 
First Natl Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d 6S1, 6S4 (Utah 1988). Therefore , we 
choose to rest our decision on governmenta l 
immuni ty and presume for purposes of argu 
ment (but do not hold) that the plaintiffs have 
stated a pr ima facie case of negligence by 
UDOT. See Kirk \>. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 125S 
(Utah App.1989). 
15. See Utah Code Arm. § 63-30-10 (1989). 
The scope of the governmenta l immun i ty issue 
in this case is limited. Plaintiffs have not sued 
any governmental personnel , and therefore , the 
Bowen came after the pathbreaking Stan-
diford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
12X0 (Utah 1980), but did not cite Standi-
ford or refer to its test for "governmental 
function," the threshold of governmental 
immunity analysis. Standiford held that 
the test for determining governmental im-
munity is "whether the activity under con-
sideration is of such a unique nature that it 
can only be performed by a governmental 
agency or that it is essential to the core of 
governmental activity." Standiford. 605 
P.2d at 1236-37. Under this test, we exam-
ine the nature of the activity itself, not the 
identity of the person performing the activ-
ity. In this case, for example, the activity 
in question consists of designing and main-
taining a road. It would make the analysis 
tautological to define the activity as design-
ing and maintaining a public or govern-
mental road.,fi 
As Judge Jackson points out in his sepa-
rate concurring opinion, the absence in 
Bowen of a reference to Standiford could 
simply be a result of the procedural pos-
ture of the Bowen case. Possibly the only 
issues before the court in Bowen were the 
elements of Boweris prima facie case, and 
the court did not reach the issue of govern-
mental immunity because it is a defense, 
rather than an element of the prima facie 
case. However, Bowen's emphasis on Riv-
immuni ty of officials is not in issue, nor h a * 
plaintiffs raised const i tut ional a rguments sixh 
as those considered in Condemarin v. University 
Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
16. In adopt ing its test for governmental func-
tion, Standiford renounced the earlier govern-
m e n t a l / p r o p r i e t a r y dist inct ion because of m 
consistencies that had developed over the courir 
of its application. 
I.ike the Standiford test, the govcrnme» 
t a l / p rop r i e t a ry dist inction was originally mcatf 
to restrict the applicat ion of governmental im-
muni ty . However, in t ime, the governme* 
t a l / p rop r i e t a ry analysis degenera ted from rt$i 
thought of its meaning to s imple catcgori/ai** 
of the activity in quest ion as involving a gotf 
course , a park, a hospital, etc. To some cxlr*. 
the same consequences can result from a faok 
categorizat ion approach unde r the Standtfamt 
test. We therefore decline U> make an cntr* m 
a laundry list of governmenta l functions per *. 
el iminat ing all thought in future cases of lift 
basic test established in Standiford. 
Cite as 790 P.2d S95 (Utah App. 1990) 
erton's duty to maintain streets becomes government is 
rather disingenuous lip service if Riverton 
had a viable defense of governmental im-
munity against all liability based on that 
duty. While procedurally it is important to 
observe the distinction between plaintiff's 
prima facie case and defendant's defenses, 
in a more basic sense, what is ultimately 
important is the scope of governmental re-
iponsibility, which, in a well-pleaded case, 
» a function both of prima facie liability 
and available defenses. It would also seem 
to be a waste of resources to reverse and 
remand Bowen for a trial on the negligence 
question if there was no way for Bowen to 
recover due to governmental immunity. 
112,13] Bowen* emphasis on the 
government's duty in tort to assure safe 
itreets is entirely consistent with Standi-
ford, if we accept the premise that the 
decision whether to exert any control at all 
over intersecting traffic is not a govern-
mental function giving rise to immunity 
from tort liability. In other words, the 
government may be held liable in tort to 
provide some effective warning or control 
for traffic at a city intersection. However, 
tfct duty to provide some effective warning 
m control must be distinguished from more 
tkan tuinimal maintenance and from en-
hancement of the means of providing warn-
ttg and control. The case of Richards v. 
Uontt, 716 P.2d 27b' (Utah 1985) (per cu-
nun) required compliance with the notice 
requirements of governmental immunity 
for i claim based on allegedly inadequate 
•aintenance of a stop sign. From a com-
p»»on of Bowen and Richards and in 
Ifht of Gleave, we conclude that as long as 
•lrning or control signage of a clear haz-
wd is in existence and maintained enough 
fc jfive it minimal effectiveness, the 
not liable in tort for its 
failure to better maintain or to enhance the 
signage. If the signage has some cogniza-
ble effect in warning or controlling traffic 
at a clear hazard, its maintenance and im-
provement ;*re governmental functions for 
which the government is immune from suit 
in Utah courts. 
Highway maintenance and improvement 
are predominately ,7 fiscal matters. Every 
highway could probably be made safer by 
further expenditures, but we will not hold 
UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) neg-
ligent for having to strike a difficult bal-
ance between the need for greater safety 
and the burden of funding improvements. 
As we pointed out in Gleave, and as UDOT 
emphasizes here, there are hundreds of 
unelectrified railroad crossings in Utah, 
and it is not fiscally feasible to equip them 
all with the best possible means of assur-
ing traffic safety. Rather, UDOT priori-
tizes the crossings in allocating the limited 
funds available for crossing improvements. 
The role of the judiciary in that prioritiza-
tion and allocation process is strictly limit-
ed. In a case seeking judicial review of 
that administrative process, we would exer-
cise our reviewing function with deference 
to the administrative agency under the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standard. How-
ever, in a tort action such as this, the 
deference to a governmental function is 
absolute unless waived, and we do not re-
view it at all under tort principles. 
In this case, we are not presented with a 
lack of any effective control of traffic, 
since there are three signs on Droubay 
Road where it approaches the railroad. 
The basis asserted here for recovery 
against UDOT is its failure to better warn 
It. Not e\ery governmental activity that affects 
ifcc public fisc is a governmental function. 
Clearly nongovernmental functions, such as 
providing utility services oi recreation, or serv 
m$ process, may be financed in pait by funds 
•fcuined through governmental revenue exac-
ttom, and liability incurred in performing those 
foauions will be satisfied out of the public 
treasury. See Schultz v. Conger, 7S5 P.2d 165 
(U*h 1988); Dalton v. Salt Fake Suburban Sani 
*r> tkst., 676 I\2d 399 (Utah 1984); Thomas v. 
Omriteld City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982); John 
mm » Salt Uke city Corp.. 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 
1981). However , the sources of funds to con-
duct the activity or to pay an eventual judgment 
do not d e t e r m i n e whe ther the activity in ques-
tion is a governmenta l function. In this case, 
d is regarding the fact that the funds for railroad 
crossings may dc i ive in part from public 
sources, wc a re never theless left with an over-
ridmgly fiscal quest ion: How much to spend on 
each rai l road cross ing that could be improved. 
Wc believe that the governmenta l budget ing and 
spending involved in deciding how to improve 
the safety of ra i l road crossings suffice to make 
that dec ision a governmenta l function. 
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and control traffic at the crossing. Since 
we have concluded that UDOT is immune 
for its failure to do more than minimal 
warning and control, we hold tha t plaintiffs 
cannot recover agains t UDOT or the State . 
CONCLUSION 
We therefore hold in this case that , even 
considering the Crommelin affidavit and 
considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, they failed to 
show any negligence by Union Pacific in 
the design and maintenance of its r ight of 
way. Union Pacific is not responsible for 
controlling traffic on s ta te roads, and the 
s ta te , having given a t least some warning 
or control at this railroad crossing, is gov-
ernmental ly immune in deciding whether to 
improve the means of warning or control a t 
the crossing because of the fiscal effects of 
such a decision 
Thus , these plaintiffs have not shown 
negligence by the railroad in the accident 
a t this crossing, where the oncoming train 
was clearly visible from a lengthy distance 
on the road toward the crossing, and the 
train was not shown to have been negli-
gently operated. Signs notified approach-
ing drivers of the crossing, but UDOT is 
not liable for not having expended more 
funds in making more extensive safety im-
provements tha t might have prevented the 
accident. The net effect of this holding is 
t ha t if the railroad's r ight of way does not 
negligently obscure an oncoming train, the 
train is properly operated, and if some visi-
ble warn ing sign age is present on the 
public road, then the plaintiff is not entitled 
to relief in tor t for an injury at the cross-
ing. We do not consider this outcome to be 
harsh or unjust, a l though any t ragedy in 
which life is lost or impaired is regret table , 
whatever the cause. 
The dismissal of the plaintiffs' case is 
affirmed. 
BENCH, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
Although I concur in the resul t reached 
by the majority and in most of its analysis, 
I write separately to disassociate myself 
from the faulty analysis of the governor 
tal immunity issue. Contrary to the mia* 
ity's characterization, supra at 6, UDOft 
general activity in this case does not ca> 
sist of "designing and maintaining a roat* 
It consists of the installation and impiw 
ment of traffic safety devices and signs« 
railroad crossings. As for the specific 
purportedly negl igent act by UDOT, pba 
tiffs in this case alleged tha t UDOT neffr 
gently failed to install a different, presaa 
ably safer, kind of traffic warning device* 
a railroad crossing. The same claims wot 
raised by the plaintiff in Gleave v. Denmt 
& Rio Grande W.R., 749 P.2d 660 llua 
Ct App.)f cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (!*$& 
As the majority recognizes, the outcome* 
this case is controlled by Gleave, in wh** 
we held tha t (1) UDOT's general activity* 
evaluat ing, installing, maintaining, and a> 
proving safety signals or devices at rm-
road crossings is a governmental functws 
within Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 l l * § 
under the tes t set forth in Standijord t, 
Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230il'ta* 
1980); and (2) the specific act of t'DQS 
which the plaintiff claimed was negltgw* 
i.e., the failure to upgrade safety device** 
a part icular railroad crossing, arose out** 
the exercise of a discretionary functws 
under the tes t in Little v. Utah State fti 
of Family Sens., 667 P.2d 49, 51 (IfiA 
1988), for which immunity had not beat 
waived by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1*1 
(1986). 
The majority appears unaware of &* 
two-step analysis—used, for example. • 
Gleave and Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores v Srf 
Lake City Corp.', 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 15** 
—that is necessary to resolve a govemiata 
tal immunity claim in which the paru» 
contest whether , even if the general art** 
ty is a governmenta l function, the alleged^ 
negligent act arose out of the exercise of* 
"discretionary function" under section &* 
30-10(1). If the genera l activity under tm 
.^deration is not a governmental funrta* 
within the meaning of section 63-30-3. \bm 
there is no immunity. If the general art*» 
ty is a governmenta l function, then tat 
Little tes t mus t be applied to determine i 
the specific, allegedly negligent art m 
omission is purely discretionary under mt 
DUNCAN v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO. Utah 6 0 3 
Che as 790 P.2d 595 (UtahApp. 1990) 
If it is purely discre- on its prior decision in Bigelow v. Ingersoll, tea 64-30- 10(l)(a) 
aoaarv. then immunity has not been 
aaned by section 63-30-10(l)(a). If it is 
art purely discretionary, then immunity 
aw been waived by section 63-30-10(1). 
TVe failure to appreciate the difference 
artween these two distinct inquiries appar-
mtij underlies the majority's confusing at-
l to harmonize the resul ts in Bowen v. 
rion City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) 
aai Rurhards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
tVtaa 1985) (per curiam) with Standiford 
mm G/eare. Governmental immunity was 
tut even an issue in Bowen, a case involv-
* f t»e allegedly negligent failure of the 
at? lo maintain a stop sign tha t had been 
iaacked down, so it is not really surprising 
aatf no mention was made of Standiford. 
% a the substance of the issues actually 
i and of the tacit assumptions made in 
not the case's procedural posture, 
at a important. The summary judgment 
£aror of the city, which the supreme 
art reversed in Bowen, had been granted 
»tae basis that the city was not negligent 
ta Matter of law on the undisputed facts; 
a wmmary judgment was not gran ted on 
a baits of any immunity. The first un-
assumption in Bowen, which was 
quently the express holding in Leav-
aX TW P.2d at 279, is tha t the maintenance 
flat repair of traffic signs is a governmen-
t s faction Leavitt, which also involved a 
ahty's failure to maintain a traffic 
device at a highway intersection, 
aatrtittd another issue not raised in Bow-
mi u , whether immunity for the exercise 
at taat governmental function had been 
aatatonly waived. The court in Bowen 
•ndy assumed that it had, or the summa-
ty axifpnent in favor of the municipality 
mtM kave been affirmed on the a l ternate 
fftaad of immunity. The Leavitt court 
aartidid that the immunity provided to 
a*e*v by section 63-30-3 for its activities 
• aaaitaining traffic control devices had 
aaa expressly waived by section 63-J0-8 
"aw any injury caused by a defective, un-
aaV or dangerous condition of any high-
*m, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side-
aak. culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
aaar structure located thereon." Relying 
618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), decided two yea rs 
before Bowen, the Leavitt cour t re-
affirmed that the express waiver of immu-
nity in section 63-30-8 is not subject to the 
section 63-30-10(l)(a) discret ionary func-
tion exception to the waiver of immunity. 
The court thus read section 63-30-8 as 
expressing the legislature 's view t h a t an 
act or omission in the exercise of a govern-
mental function tha t created a "defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition" on a public 
way could never involve activity a t the 
basic policy-making level for which immuni-
ty is preserved by section 63-30-10(1 )(a). 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Leavitt and Bige-
low, however, but exactly like the injured 
plaintiff and appellant railroad in Gleave, 
749 P.2d at 667 & n. 6, the plaintiffs in this 
case have never pleaded or contended tha t 
the discretionary function analysis under 
section 63-30-10(l)(a) is unnecessary and 
irrelevant because the decedents ' injuries 
resulted from an unsafe or dangerous con-
dition on a road within the purview of 
section 63-30-8. Instead, they asked the 
trial court and us to overrule one of the 
two aforementioned holdings in Gleave and 
conclude either tha t (1) UDOT's evaluation, 
installation, maintenance, and improvement 
of safety signals or devices a t railroad 
crossings is not a governmenta l function 
within section 63-30-3; or (2) UDOT's fail-
ure to install upgraded safety devices a t 
the subject railroad crossing did not ar ise 
out of a section 63-30-10(l)(a) discret ionary 
function. 
Since my colleagues and I have unani-
mously declined the invitation to abandon 
Gleave, it is unfor tunate t ha t the majority 
adds confusion to an already difficult a rea 
of law in its flawed analysis of Leavitt and 
Bowen, which should be disregarded as 
dicta. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEWIS DUNCAN, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the Estate of PATRICK DUNCAN, 
deceased, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 84-146 
The above-referenced matter came before the Court for oral 
argument en November 12, 1987. Counsel for the various parties 
appeared and argued their respective positions. Prior to the 
oral argument, the parties had submitted Memoranda of Poinds and 
Authorities, as well as Affidavits and other documentary evidence 
addressing the issues raised in the various Motions. Following 
oral argument, the Court ruled from the bench on portions of the 
defendant Union Pacific Railroad's (hereinafter "Railroad") 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The remainder of the Motions were 
taken under advisement for further consideration of the issues 
raised. The Court has since argument, again reviewed the 
Memoranda of Points and Authorities, and other materials 
submitted, and being fully advised, enters the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
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MOTIONS PREVIOUSLY GRANTED 
As indicated above, the Court granted a portion of the 
Railroad's Motion for Summary Judgment. From the bench, at the 
conclusion of oral argument, the Court determined that there was 
no evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the Railroad 
operated the train in a negligent manner. To the contrary, the 
only evidence presented went to the proposition that the train 
was operated in a reasonable, safe and prudent manner. In 
addition, there was no evidence offered by the plaintiffs that 
suggested that their claim that the engineer, co-defendant 
Kleinman, was incompetent. The only evidence before the Court is 
again to the contrary, and establishes that the defendant 
Kleinman was a competent and qualified engineer. Therefore, the 
Railroad and Kleinman's Motions for Summary Judgment on those 
issues were granted. There was also a Morion to Strike a portion 
of the plaintiffs' Brief that contained inappropriate comments. 
The plaintiff did net object, and the Metier, was granted, and the 
word "murdered" in plaintiffs' Brief was stricken pursuant to 
Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of an automobile/train collision that 
occurred on April S, 1983, at approximately 8:50 p.m. The 
collision took place at the crossing of the defendant's railroad 
tracks, and Droubay Road in a rural portion of Tooele County. 
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The train was operated by defendant Kleinman; a deceased, Patrick 
Duncan, operated the automobile and, in addition to the operator, 
the autcmcbile contained three passengers. All four occupants of 
the automobile were killed as a result of the collision. I- was 
dark at the time of the collision, and the weather was net a 
factor. The automobile's and the train's lights were lit. The 
train had in operation a dual headlighr, and a strobe light, both 
exceeding federally mandated standards. Droubay Road crosses the 
railroad tracks at an oblique angle of approximately 13 6* in the 
direction that the automobile was planning on crossing the 
tracks. Considering the direction of the autcmcbile and the 
train, the train was therefore approaching the crossing to the 
righc from of the aurcmcbile. The defendant engineer, Kleinman, 
observed the autcmcbile approaching the crossing for seme 
substantial distance before the crossing, and assumed tha- the 
auuomcbile wculd stop prior to reaching the crossing. Ey the 
time the defendant Kleinman was able to observe that the 
automobile was not going to stop, it was ncz possible to stop the 
train, or take other evasive action before the impact occurred. 
The required whistle and bells on the train were operating for 
the prescribed distance prior to the crossing. Other than 
railroad personnel on the train, there were no eyewitnesses to 
the collision that survived. Based upon the material submitted, 
there is no obstruction to the observation of an approaching 
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train for an automobile driver approaching, as was the Duncan 
automobile in this case for some substantial distance before the 
crossing (investigating officer's tests). 
Plaintiffs1 counsel orally argued that the terrain 
approaching the crossing was not flat as suggested by the 
defendants, but offered no support for that conclusion. The 
photos, submitted to show the terrain, suggests the contrary, and 
there is no genuine issue of material fact that is disputed en 
that point. The signing on the road preceding the crossing 
consisted of a traditional railroad crossing sign at 
approximately 305 fee- in advance cf the crossing. Ur.rafutad 
tests offered by the defendants show that the sign was visible at 
nigh::, using automobile low beams for a distance cf three-
quarters of a mile. The white crossing sign at the crossing 
itself was also visible at that distance. An automobile 
traveling with high beams would be able to observe the signs in 
question a mile distant from the crossing. The automobile and 
the train collided front-to-front at the crossing. There is a 
disputed issue of fact regarding the effect of marijuana use by 
the deceased driver Duncan. For the purposes of this Motion, the 
Court accepts the proposition that the plaintiffs assert, to wit: 
that marijuana ingestion by the plaintiff driver had no effect on 
his ability to operate the vehicle in any fashion, and that his 
judgment was not impaired. At the time of the accident there 
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were no flashing signals at the crossing, nor crossing arnis 
prohibiting the passage of vehicle traffic onto the crossing. 
RAILROAD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad was negligent in net 
installing additional warning lights or other devices at the 
crossing. Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad has a duty to 
install such devices concurrently with the State of Utah, and 
more particularly the Utah Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter referred to as "State" or "UDCT"). The Railroad 
denies this duty, and claims that the determination of need and 
the decision to install signing and ether warnings is the sole 
and exclusive responsibility of the State. With that preposition 
the Court agrees. Utah statutes place the responsibility clearly 
upen the State for making the determination of what type of 
signing and when it should be installed on railroad crossings. 
This conclusion is true, even in the face of the 1975 amendment 
to Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. The courts 
that have interpreted Section 54-4-15, as amended, have held and 
this Court finds those holdings persuasive, that no duty exists 
in law for the Railroad to independently, or concurrently with 
the State, install or maintain crossing signs, lights, and ether 
traffic control devices at railroad crossings. There being no 
duty to sign or place signals at railroad crossings on the part 
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of the Railroad, the remainder of the Railroad!s Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted. 
STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In considering the Statefs Motion for Summary Judgment, it 
must be considered in two phases. First, it must be determined 
if the State is entitled to immunity in this case, because of the 
State's claim that crossing, signing and signals are 
discretionary, and therefore governmental immunity is not waived 
and applies, and secondly, even if such activity is a 
discretionary function, is the State still liable because of the 
plaintiffs' claim that the crossing is extra hazardous. 
The process used by UDOT personnel in making their 
inspection of railroad crossings in this state to determine what 
type cf signs and signals should be used is a process requiring 
both the use of objective and subjective factors and 
considerations. It must first be determined whether or not a 
particular crossing requires more than just advance signing. If 
it is so determined, then it must be determined to apply for 
whatever federal funding is available. The crossing must also be 
rated by UDOT personnel and given a position on a priority 
listing for crossings for which federal funding has been 
requested throughout the state. In reaching a priority 
evaluation, the inspection team evaluates the potential hazards 
of the crossing compared to all others in the state. This -
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procedure is fully described in the State's Brief and supporting 
documents. The process is far beyond the perfunctory decisions 
that government officials may make on a day-in and day-out basis, 
which are not entitled to protection as discretionary decisions. 
The process of evaluation involved here embodies the classic 
elements of a discretionary function, to wit: balancing various 
needs of differing railroad crossings throughout the state, 
weighing competing interests for available funding, balancing 
potential risk versus dollar and manpower available. The Court 
finds that the decision to add additional signs or signals to 
this crossing, and when to do iz was a discretionary function for 
which the State has nor waived immunity under Section 62-3C-
10(1) (a), Utah Coda Ann., 1952 as amended. Having determined 
thar the State is entitled to immunity under the exception of a 
discretionary function, the Court declines to address the c-her 
two grounds for immunity asserted by the Sta~a. 
The plaintiff also claims that even if a decision to insrall 
signs and signals is discretionary, the exemption dees net apply, 
because the crossing is extra hazardous. While the Court is net 
necessarily convinced that the plaintiffs' proposition is a 
correct statement of the law, the Court is satisfied as a matter 
of law that the crossing in question does not fall into the 
category of extra hazardous. This conclusion is reached for two 
reasons. First, the plaintiffs1 expert: Affidavit upon which the 
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plaintiffs rely to establish their claim of an extra hazardous 
crossing is based upon inadmissible evidence and a flawed 
foundation- Secondly, and more important, the evidence presented 
clearly shows that this crossing does not fall into the type of 
crossing contemplated by the Supreme Court in defining extra 
hazardous crossings. 
Plaintiffs have filed the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin in 
which Mr. Crommelin opines that based, at least in substantial 
par::, on the inspection and surveillance reports of the State 
officials at UDOT, that the crossing is extra hazardous. That 
opinion is without foundation or basis when the report relied 
upon is removed from consideration, as it must be in this case. 
22 U.S.C. 409 prohibits any court, state or federal, from 
receiving into evidence reports and other information such as 
UDCT surveillance reports. The policy reasons behind Congress's 
action is clear. It is to encourage the full and free exchange 
of information, and to encourage candid reports, conclusions and 
evaluations by governmental officials conducting inspections at 
railroad crossings and the like. Were the reports and ether 
information admissible, inspection teams would be chilled in 
making accurate reports so as to insure that they were net 
hindsighted at a later time in liability actions by statements 
and evaluations contained in those reports. Plaintiffs1 expert's 
conclusions are also based upon misinformation. Mr. Crommelin 
relies upon a "projected" traffic density of 1,500 vehicles per 
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day, when in actuality the density was at most 530 vehicles per 
day. The statement that the placement of the advance warning 
sign violated federal standards for distance is also misplaced. 
The federal statute does not mandate a specific distance, it 
provides a suggested distance. In any event, the placement of 
the sign could have no proximate effect upon the accident in any 
event. The driver either failed to see the sign, or ignored the 
sign, and it makes little difference if an operator dees net see, 
or ignores a sign 305 feet from a railroad crossing, as opposed 
to not: seeing or ignoring a sign that is 750 feet from a railroad 
crossing. A careful review of the Crcmmelin claim of "similar 
accidents'1 at the crossing further shows that his use of tr.a-
basis for determining that this crossing is ultra hazardous is in 
error. The three prior accidents upon which he relies are nco 
similar to the action in question at all. One involved a 
collision with a train where visibility was poor in a snewszorm. 
The ethers involved automobiles coming from the opposite 
direction, which substantially changes the angle at which the 
train approaches the intersection, as compared to the oncoming 
approaching car, and are otherwise substantially dissimilar. 
These differences were pointed out in defendant Railroad's 
Memoranda, dated May 26, 1987, and the Court has received no 
addition to Mr. Crommelin's Affidavit to suggest that his 
conclusions are or can be based upon proper foundations. 
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Considered as a whole, the opinion of Mr. Crommelin, because of 
the less of its underpinnings, cannot be considered as raising a 
substantial or genuine material issue of fact on the issue of the 
crossing being extra hazardous or not. 
More important than the lack of plaintiff raising a genuine 
issue of fact on the nature of the crossing by way of Mr, 
Crommelin1s Affidavit, is the Court's evaluation through the 
photos and other documents submitted of the crossing itself. 
This crossing as a matter of law dees not meet the Supreme Ccur-
test as outlined in Bridces v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 433 
P.2d 373 (Utah 1971). As ncced by the Supreme Ccur- in the 
Eridcres case, there must be something unusual abcu~ the crossing. 
The phonos and investigating officer's tas~s and observations all 
show than the surrounding land in the area of the automobile's 
approach is reasonably flat. It is flai, at leas- to the extent 
that the approaching train can be readily seen and observed by 
the driver of an approaching automobile. There are no buildings 
or other structures in the area to diver- a driver's attention, 
or to otherwise confuse. There are no other lights or unusual 
noises to confuse or deceive an otherwise unsuspecting driver. 
In sum, there is nothing about this crossing that could provide 
notice to UDOT personnel that the warnings which were there at 
the time of the accident were not adequate to warn the public. 
While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is hard to 
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imagine a crossing that presents a smaller hazard than the one in 
question before the Court. The Court therefore determines that 
reasonably minds could not differ on whether or not this crossing 
is extra hazardous, and concludes as a matter of law that the 
crossing is not extra hazardous. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is equally well-taken as that of the Railroad, and 
should therefore be, and the same is hereby granted. 
Counsel for the Railroad and Kleinman are requested to 
prepare an appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum 
Decision granting their Morion for Summary Judgment, and counsel 
for the State is likewise requested to prepare an Order granting 
the Scare's Mccicn for Summary Judgment in accordance wi~h this 
Memorandum Decision, and submit the same to the Court for review 
and signature in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice. 
Datec this // day of November, 1937. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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